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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

MEDICARE: WHAT ARE THE REAL PROBLEMS? WHAT
CONTRIBUTION CAN LAW MAKE TO REAL SOLUTIONS?
TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST*
In certain circles it is popular to present Medicare as a problem. The
Report of the Trustees of the Medicare Trust Fund, for example, is regularly
full of gloom and doom.1 The 2007 Medicare Trust Fund Report predicts:
The projected date of HI [Hospital Insurance] Trust Fund exhaustion is
2019, one year later than in last year’s report, when tax income will be
sufficient to pay only 79 percent of HI costs. HI tax income falls short of
outlays in this and all future years. The program could be brought into
actuarial balance over the next 75 years by an immediate 122 percent
increase in the payroll tax, or an immediate 51 percent reduction in
program outlays or some combination of the two.2

Pro-market advocacy groups, such as the Heritage Foundation and the
Cato Institute, argue that the Medicare program in its current form is
“unsustainable” and must be changed, preferably through the use of
* Robert L. Willett Family Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University School of Law. The
author gratefully acknowledges the support of the Frances Lewis Law Center for research for
this article.
1. See, e.g., BD. OF TRS. OF THE FED. OLD-AGE & SURVIVORS INS. & FED. DISABILITY INS.
TRUST FUNDS, STATUS OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE PROGRAMS: A SUMMARY OF THE
2007 ANNUAL SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE TRUST FUND REPORTS (2007), available at
www.ssa.gov/OACT/TRSUM/tr07summary.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2007) [hereinafter 2007
TRUST FUND REPORTS SUMMARY]. Although the name of this body suggests neutral and
dispassionate fiscal analysis, four of the six Trustees are political appointees of the President of
the United States: the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Health
and Human Services, and the Commissioner of Social Security. Id. at 1. One of the two
public Trustees, Thomas R. Saving, is one of the most radical academic critics of social
insurance in the United States. His views are exemplified in MEDICARE REFORM: ISSUES AND
ANSWERS (Andrew J. Rettenmaier & Thomas R. Saving eds., The University of Chicago Press
1999). In the late 1990s, Saving received $431,230 in Medicare Reform Grants from the
Lynde & Harry Bradley Foundation, one of the nation’s most influential right-wing advocacy
foundations. Thomas R. Saving, Resume, at http://econweb.tamu.edu/saving/saving%20
resume.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2007); Media Transparency, The Lynde and Harry Bradley
Foundation, Inc., at www.mediatransparency.org/funderprofile.php?funderID=1 (last visited
Oct. 8, 2007).
2. 2007 TRUST FUND REPORTS SUMMARY, supra note 1, at A MESSAGE TO THE PUBLIC,
MEDICARE.
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“market” solutions.3 Health law scholar David Hyman has written a book
(published by the Cato Institute) contending that Medicare embodies the
seven deadly sins and undermines the cardinal virtues.4
It is important, nevertheless, to remember that, for most of its
constituencies, Medicare is not a problem but rather the solution to a
problem. Medicare continues to be popular with beneficiaries and, indeed,
with the American public generally.5 It provides greater freedom of choice
than virtually any private insurer as well as reasonably good coverage,
particularly for hospital and physician services.6 Healthcare professionals
and providers have done quite well financially under the Medicare program
in its current form, which offers payment levels close to those offered by
private insurers, pays more quickly than most private insurers, and almost
never second-guesses treatment decisions.7 Moreover, Medicare is a real,
although often largely invisible, boon to the families of the elderly and
disabled. For example, my life would be quite different if I would have had
to spend the past two decades worrying about the medical expenses of my
parents while they were still alive and of my mother-in-law who is now well
into her nineties.
When viewed from a larger public policy perspective, however,
Medicare does present a problem; indeed, it presents several. First,
Medicare is a program with many coverage gaps and comparatively high
3. See J.D. Foster, The Social Security and Medicare Trustees Report Again—and Again
Problems Have Worsened, WEB MEMO (The Heritage Found. Wash., D.C.), Apr. 24, 2007, at
1, 3, available at www.heritage.org/Research/Budget/upload/wm_1430.pdf (last visited Aug.
31, 2007); Cato Institute, Health Care: Medicare (2007), at www.cato.org/healthcare/
medicare.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2007).
4. DAVID A. HYMAN, MEDICARE MEETS MEPHISTOPHELES (2006).
5. Jill Bernstein & Rosemary A. Stevens, Public Opinion, Knowledge, and Medicare
Reform, 18 HEALTH AFF. 180, 181 (1999) (stating that three-quarters of Americans believe that
Medicare is “important to their own families”).
6. Traditional Medicare, unlike most private managed care plans, offers free choice of
provider. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395a (2000). Of physicians surveyed in 2006 for the Medicare
Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), only 3.3% claimed they were not accepting new
Medicare patients, whereas 13.7% claimed they were not accepting any new private health
maintenance organization (HMO) patients. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO
THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 104 (Mar. 2007), available at www.medpac.gov/
documents/Mar07_EntireReport.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2007) [hereinafter MEDICARE
PAYMENT POLICY].
7. In 2005, the last year for which data is available, Medicare physician payment rates
were equivalent to approximately 83% of private insurance rates. MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY,
supra note 6, at 97. Physicians, however, were more likely to report that they were “not very
concerned” or “not at all concerned” about billing and paperwork or timeliness of payments
with respect to Medicare than with respect to private commercial or Medicaid patients. Id. at
105, 110. The number of physicians and hospitals accepting Medicare patients is increasing
steadily. Id. at 53, 108.
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cost-sharing. Although some of the biggest gaps in the program, including
lack of coverage for prescription drugs and preventive care, have been
partially plugged in recent years, the program still fails to cover chronic,
long-term nursing home care and dental and vision care, has high
coinsurance levels on the Part B side, and lacks a catastrophic benefit.8
Medicare still covers only about 45% of the total healthcare costs of
beneficiaries.9
Those who have good Medicare Advantage, retiree,
Medicaid, or Medigap coverage are less burdened by cost-sharing. But,
those who do not qualify for or cannot afford these forms of gap coverage,
often the group least capable of paying the excess cost, disproportionately
bear the burden of cost-sharing in terms of proportion of income spent on
healthcare.10
Second, Medicare’s methods of paying for services are problematic.
Medicare pays for services through administered price systems or through
As other articles in this Symposium
managed care programs.11
demonstrate, the Medicare Advantage program costs much more than
traditional Medicare while offering few off-setting advantages.12 Indeed, the
Medicare Advantage Program is best understood either as the product of a
naive blind faith or as a response to aggressive and well-funded lobbying by
the health insurance industry.13 Administered price systems, on the other

8. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE: MEDICARE AT A GLANCE 1 (Feb. 2007),
available at www.kff.org/medicare/upload/1066-10.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2007)
[hereinafter KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, MEDICARE AT A GLANCE]; see Susan Adler Channick,
The Ongoing Debate Over Medicare: Understanding the Philosophical and Policy Divides, 36
J. HEALTH L. 59, 73-75 (2003) (discussing the failed Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act).
9. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, MEDICARE AT A GLANCE, supra note 8, at 2.
10. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: NEW
APPROACHES IN MEDICARE 199 (June 2004), available at www.medpac.gov/documents/
June04_Entire_Report.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2007) [hereinafter NEW APPROACHES IN
MEDICARE]; Thomas Rice & Katherine A. Desmond, The Distributional Consequences of a
Medicare Premium Support Proposal, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1187, 1213-14 (2004).
11. TIMOTHY S. JOST & SHARON L. DAVIES, THE LAW OF MEDICARE AND MEDICAID FRAUD AND
ABUSE 7 (3d ed. 2002); Channick, supra note 8, at 66.
12. See Robert A. Berenson & Melissa A. Goldstein, Will Medicare Wither on the Vine?
How Congress Has Advantaged Medicare Advantage—and What’s a Level Playing Field
Anyway?, 1 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 5, 5 (2007); Timothy D. McBride, Medicare
Advantage: What are We Trying to Achieve Anyway?, 1 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y
(forthcoming May 2008).
13. See Alain C. Enthoven & Sara J. Singer, Market-Based Reform: What to Regulate and
by Whom, 14 HEALTH AFF. 105, 106 (1995) (“[M]arket forces in health care if left unchecked
can produce undesirable results.”). In 2006, the health sector (doctors, drug companies, and
hospitals, among other groups) spent $351.1 million on lobbying the federal government
(13.8% of total spending on lobbying across all sectors). Robert Steinbrook, Election 2008—
Campaign Contributions, Lobbying, and the U.S. Health Sector, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 736,
738 (2007); see also Steven H. Landers & Ashwini R. Sehgal, Health Care Lobbying in the
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hand, also present problems. Underservice results when Medicare pays too
little or does not pay at all (e.g., Medicare generally does not pay for the
time involved in email or telephone communications between doctors and
patients, thus such communications rarely occur).14 When Medicare pays
too much, market distortions arise. For example, overpayment for certain
procedures has contributed to the increase in physician-owned specialty
hospitals, such as those specializing in cardiac services.15 Fraud and abuse
seem to follow both overpayment and underpayment.16
The biggest problem with Medicare, according to the consensus of
opinions, is that the program is unsustainable in the long-term as currently
funded.17 While the Medicare Trust Fund Report must be recognized as a
political statement, it also reflects the reality that the cost of Medicare will
continue to increase dramatically in the future. Moreover, the problematic
nature of the Medicare program’s fiscal situation is accepted not just by
right-wing advocacy groups, but also by the Comptroller General of the
United States and centrist think tanks.18

United States, 116 AM. J. MED. 474 (2004) (using Lobbying Disclosure Act reports to assess
healthcare lobbying at the federal level).
14. Robert A. Berenson & Jane Horvath, Confronting the Barriers to Chronic Care
Management in Medicare, 2003 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCL.) w3-37, w3-40, available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w3.37v1 (last visited Aug. 31, 2007).
Paying for these services appropriately, however, is very difficult. Cf. id. at w3-39 to -40
(noting that physicians will suffer financially when telephone and email communications are
non-reimbursable, therefore threatening to freeze “innovation in how clinical care is
practiced”).
15. See Jack Hadley & Stephen Zuckerman, Physician-Owned Specialty Hospitals: A
Market Signal for Medicare Payment Revisions, 2005 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCL.) w5-491,
available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w5.491v1 (last visited Oct. 9,
2007).
16. JOST & DAVIES, supra note 11, at 8-12; see also Elizabeth A. Weeks, Gauging the
Cost of Loopholes: Health Care Pricing and Medicare Regulation in the Post-Enron Era, 40
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1215 (2005) (discussing the role of Medicare payment incentives in
stimulating fraud and abuse).
17. See Foster, supra note 3, at 1, 3.
18. See Medicare: Comptroller General Walker Warns About Increasing Medicare, Social
Security Costs on ‘Fiscal Wakeup Tour’, KAISER DAILY HEALTH POLICY REPORT (The Henry J.
Kaiser Family Found., Menlo Park, CA), June 1, 2007, at www.kaisernetwork.org/
daily_reports/rep_index.cfm?hint=3&DR_ID=45293 (last visited Aug. 31, 2007); see also
Joseph White, Protecting Medicare: The Best Defense is a Good Offense, 32 J. HEALTH POL.
POL’Y & L. 221, 221-22 (2007) (noting that the challenge to Medicare comes not just from the
right-wing, which has long opposed the program, but also from centrists who are legitimately
concerned about Medicare’s long-term fiscal viability).
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Medicare was created as a social insurance program.19 Part A,20 which
covers inpatient hospital care and other institutional services, is funded
through employer and employee payroll taxes, just like Social Security and
European social insurance programs.21 Parts B22 and D23 are funded by a
mixture of general revenue funds and beneficiary premiums.24 In 2006,
funding was approximately 76% general revenue and 21% premiums.25 All
of this income is put into trust funds out of which payments for Parts A, B,
and D services are made.26
As the population ages; as the baby boomers have moved through
youth and middle age and are now approaching retirement; as Congress
uses the trust funds to finance chronic deficit spending and tax cuts;27 and,
most importantly, as the cost of healthcare continues to grow at a rate far in
excess of the rate of general inflation (reflecting price and utilization
increases as well as changes in the nature of healthcare and of disease),
two concerns become obvious. First, the cost of the Medicare program as a
proportion of the gross domestic product will continue to grow; and,
second, funding Medicare as it was funded in the past will be impossible.28
Too much can be, and usually is, made of these problems. In fact, the
Medicare program will not go bankrupt and shut down. Medicare is an

19. TIMOTHY S. JOST, DISENTITLEMENT? THE THREATS FACING OUR PUBLIC HEALTH-CARE
PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE 63-64 (2003) (discussing the historical foundations
of the Medicare Program).
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c to i-5 (2000).
21. 2007 TRUST FUND REPORTS SUMMARY, supra note 1, at 2; JOST, supra note 19, at 5051, 71-72, 85.
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395j to w-4.
23. Id. §§ 1395w-101 to w-152 (Supp. IV 2004).
24. See 2007 TRUST FUND REPORTS SUMMARY, supra note 1, at 1. Part C, the Medicare
Advantage program, covers Part A and B services through managed care. These services are
funded in the same way that Part A and B services would otherwise be funded. See Medicare
Information Service, Medicare Part C, at www.medicare.org/content/view/17/51 (last visited
Sept. 4, 2007).
25. See 2007 TRUST FUND REPORTS SUMMARY, supra note 1, at 3; JENNIFER O’SULLIVAN,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, MEDICARE: PART B PREMIUMS CRS-3–CRS-4 (Sept. 2004).
26. The Hospital Insurance (HI) Trust Fund pays for Part A services. The Supplemental
Medical Insurance (SMI) Trust Fund pays for both Part B and Part D services. 2007 TRUST
FUND REPORTS SUMMARY, supra note 1, at 1.
27. See Channick, supra note 8, at 59-60, 67.
28. 2007 TRUST FUND REPORTS SUMMARY, supra note 1, at A MESSAGE TO THE PUBLIC,
MEDICARE; Channick, supra note 8, at 62. On the relationship between the Medicare Trust
Funds and the Federal budget, see OFFICE OF ECONOMIC POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE TRUST FUNDS AND THE FEDERAL BUDGET: AN EXPANDED
EXPOSITION (Mar. 2004), available at www.treas.gov/offices/economic-policy/reports/
budget_trust_fund_3_23.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2007).
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entitlement under federal law29 and will continue to pay its beneficiaries’
bills until Congress repeals or amends the law, regardless of the balance of
the trust funds.30 Moreover, one must take seventy-year cost projections,
common in political discussions about Medicare,31 with a grain of salt.32 To
see why, consider that over the past five years housing prices in Los Angeles
(L.A.) have increased 116%.33 The median home price in L.A. is currently
$575,000.34 If one simply projects forward a compounded appreciation in
the value of housing at this rate for seventy years, the median home in L.A.
will cost $49 billion. The conclusion drawn from this projection using the
same analysis often applied to Medicare is clear—every homeowner in L.A.
should sell now before housing becomes unaffordable.
From the perspective of the sober policy (or financial) analyst, however,
two things seem relatively clear. First, housing costs are unlikely to continue
to increase to the point where housing becomes completely unaffordable.
In fact, housing price increases in L.A. have recently begun to stabilize.35
(Similarly, healthcare price increases have stabilized in most other
developed countries over the past two decades in comparison to price
growth in the United States.)36 Second, if housing costs do continue to
increase, we will find a way to deal with the higher costs. For one thing,
incomes will continue to grow, and, while housing might consume a larger
proportion of income as it now does in many other countries,37 it will still be
affordable. We may also eventually start using one-hundred-year, inter-

29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 426, 426-1(a), 1395c (2000).
30. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 426, 1395d, 1395k, which establishes Medicare entitlements
without conditioning them on a particular funding source. The word entitlement occurs over
100 times in Title XVIII of the Social Security Act (which creates the Medicare program) and
refers to the rights of beneficiaries and sometimes providers. See JOST, supra note 19, at 31.
31. See, e.g., 2007 TRUST FUND REPORTS SUMMARY, supra note 1, at A MESSAGE TO THE
PUBLIC, MEDICARE.
32. What is the Role of the Federal Medicare Actuary?, ISSUE BRIEF (Amer. Acad. of
Actuaries, Wash. D.C.), Jan. 2002, at 3, available at http://actuary.org/pdf/medicare/
medicare_actuary_jan02.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2007) (“Seventy-five-year projections based
on a large number of demographic and economic variables should be regarded with
caution.”).
33. MSN Money Staff, Home Prices by City, MSN MONEY, Aug. 30, 2007, at
http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Banking/HomebuyingGuide/HomePricesByCity.aspx
(last visited Sept. 5, 2007).
34. HousingTracker.net, Los Angeles, California, June 1, 2007, at www.housing
tracker.net/old_housingtracker/location/California/LosAngeles (last visited Sept. 5, 2007).
35. See id.
36. Chapin White, Health Care Spending Growth: How Different is the United States from
the Rest of the OECD?, 26 HEALTH AFF. 154, 156 (2007).
37. See U.N. DEP’T. OF ECON. & SOC. AFF., STATISTICAL YEARBOOK at 201-205 tbl.22,
U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/STAT/SER.S/26, U.N. Sales No. E/F.06.XVII.1 (50th ed. 2006).
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generational mortgages, as do homeowners in Switzerland and Japan, 38
but we will, nevertheless, develop solutions to the problem. We will not see
everyone sleeping in the streets while houses sit empty because no one can
afford them.
We will also solve the problem of financing Medicare. But how? A
number of possible approaches currently are being discussed. First, more of
the costs could be shifted onto beneficiaries by increasing cost-sharing or
decreasing benefits. Indeed, one of the core beliefs of the consumer-driven
healthcare (CDHC) movement is that we need more cost-sharing across the
board.39 Increased cost-sharing, CDHC advocates contend, has many
benefits. It makes healthcare purchasers more prudent shoppers, less likely
to waste money on unnecessary care, and more likely to shop around for
the best prices and even for the best quality care.40 Some also argue that
Medicare beneficiaries are quite wealthy compared to the working
population and that they can and should be required to bear a greater
share of the cost of their care.41
However, there are several problems with increasing Medicare costsharing. First, although some Medicare beneficiaries are in fact quite
wealthy, most are not. Nearly half of all beneficiaries (approximately 47%)
have incomes at 200% of the federal poverty level (FPL) or less.42 Less than
one quarter have incomes exceeding 400% of the FPL.43 In 2001, the
median net worth of households headed by a person age sixty-five to
seventy-four was $176,000; however, on average, $129,000 of that value
was tied to equity in their primary residence.44 Furthermore, as the head of
the household gets older, this net worth declines.45 On average, Medicare
beneficiaries spend nearly 20% of their income on healthcare; although, the
median beneficiary spends only 10%.46 The beneficiaries who spend the
most on healthcare, including older beneficiaries and those with chronic
38. James Daley, The Mortgage Gift Your Kids Won’t Thank You for, THE INDEPENDENT
(London), Aug. 26, 2006, Features at 3.
39. See MICHAEL F. CANNON & MICHAEL D. TANNER, HEALTHY COMPETITION: WHAT’S
HOLDING BACK HEALTH CARE AND HOW TO FREE IT 46-54 (2005); JOHN C. GOODMAN &
GERALD L. MUSGRAVE, PATIENT POWER: SOLVING AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE CRISIS 231-59 (Cato
Institute 1992).
40. CANNON & TANNER, supra note 39, at 51-57; GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, supra note
39, at 249-51.
41. See, e.g., David A. Hyman, Medicare Meets Mephistopheles, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1165, 1175 (2003).
42. NEW APPROACHES IN MEDICARE, supra note 10, at 199.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 196.
45. Id. (noting that for households headed by a person aged seventy-five or older,
median net worth declined to $151,000).
46. Id. at 197.
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medical conditions, tend to have lower than average incomes and
resources. Statistics illustrating these facts show that beneficiaries with
incomes below the federal poverty line spend nearly 45% of their income on
healthcare; beneficiaries aged eighty-five years and older spend over 30%;
and beneficiaries in poor health spend almost 30%.47 Medicare currently
only covers about 45% of the total healthcare costs of its beneficiaries,48
and many beneficiaries have a limited financial margin to cover additional
costs.
Second, shifting more costs to Medicare beneficiaries may not, in fact,
improve efficiency. Empirical arguments for cost-sharing are usually based
on the findings of the Rand Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) from the
1970s and 80s.49 The HIE, however, intentionally excluded persons over
age sixty-two and the disabled, and, thus, cannot tell us exactly how those
groups would respond to higher cost-sharing.50 Although the experiment
found that, in general, persons who face higher cost-sharing spend less, it
also found that they spend less on essential care to the same extent that they
spend less on nonessential care.51 Moreover, although the experiment
found that participants generally did not suffer adverse health consequences
when they spent less on healthcare, it did find some adverse health
consequences for the poor and persons with chronic diseases.52
Subsequent studies, particularly of pharmaceutical cost-sharing, have shown
that increased cost-sharing can, in fact, contribute to serious health
problems.53 Finally, increasing Medicare cost-sharing will certainly result in
both higher Medicaid expenditures (as Medicaid usually covers cost-sharing
costs for dual eligibles)54 and higher Medicare “bad debt” reimbursement to
hospitals.55
A second and related approach to solving the problem of financing
Medicare is to means test, i.e., charge wealthier beneficiaries higher
47. NEW APPROACHES IN MEDICARE, supra note 10, at 198.
48. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, MEDICARE AT A GLANCE, supra note 8.
49. See, e.g., JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE ET AL., FREE FOR ALL? LESSONS FROM THE RAND HEALTH
INSURANCE EXPERIMENT 341 (RAND 1993).
50. Id. at 11.
51. Id. at 162.
52. Id. at 201, 204, 208, 219, 243, 251, 259, and 339-40.
53. John Hsu et al., Unintended Consequences of Caps on Medicare Drug Benefits, 354
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2349, 2349 (2006); Robin Tamblyn et al., Adverse Events Associated with
Prescription Drug Cost-Sharing Among Poor and Elderly Persons, 285 JAMA 421, 421 (2001).
54. See KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., DUAL ELIGIBLES: MEDICAID’S ROLE FOR LOW-INCOME MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES (2005),
available at www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/4091-04%20Final(v2).pdf (last visited Sept. 28,
2007).
55. 42 C.F.R. § 413.89 (2007) (“[B]ad debts attributable to the deductibles and
coinsurance amounts are reimbursable under the program.”).
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premiums for program participation. Critics of the current program
structure argue that millionaires should not be able to get Medicare
coverage on the same terms as the poor.56 The Medicare Modernization
Act (MMA) took a step towards means-testing Medicare by increasing Part B
premiums for individual beneficiaries who annually earn more than
$80,000 and couples who earn over $160,000 beginning in 2007, with
further increases to be phased in over the next five years.57 The MMA also
provided subsidies for low-income enrollees in the Part D drug program,
effectively means-testing the Part D program since higher income
beneficiaries receive less than those with lower incomes.58
There are two primary problems with means testing as a strategy for
saving Medicare. First, as has already been noted, most Medicare
beneficiaries are not very wealthy. Therefore, increasing the premiums born
by higher income beneficiaries is unlikely to make a substantial dent in the
cost of the program. The increased premiums for wealthier beneficiaries
built into the MMA are projected to yield about $2 billion a year, which is
only about one-half of 1% of program cost.59 Second, if premium costs for
higher income beneficiaries become high enough, a market is likely to
develop for private health insurance for seniors, allowing wealthier and
healthier beneficiaries to opt out of Medicare.60 Thus, Medicare will be left
with a more costly group of beneficiaries and, most likely, with weakened
political support.61 Wealthy Medicare beneficiaries should, of course,
contribute to the cost of the program. However, they should do so as
taxpayers, not as premium payers.
A third proposal to “save Medicare” that has been around for a long
time is to turn Medicare into a managed competition program similar to the
Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, in the hope that competition
will bring down costs.62 This was the goal of the Medicare+Choice
56. See, e.g., Stuart M. Butler, Time is Running Out for Medicare Reform, THE HERITAGE
FOUND., Apr. 30, 1997, at www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/BG1112.cfm (last visited
Sept. 28, 2007).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1395r(i) (Supp. III 2003); see also O’SULLIVAN, supra note 25, at CRS-7–
CRS-8.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-114.
59. Mark V. Pauly, Means-Testing in Medicare, 2004 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCL.) w4-546,
w4-547, available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.546v1.pdf (last
visited Sept. 28, 2007).
60. See Theodore R. Marmor & Jerry L. Mashaw, Understanding Social Insurance:
Fairness, Affordability, and the ‘Modernization’ of Social Security and Medicare, 2006 HEALTH
AFF. (WEB EXCL.) w114, w131; Robert Pear, Medicare Costs to Increase for Wealthier
Beneficiaries, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2006, at A10.
61. See Marmor & Mashaw, supra note 60.
62. See Medicare Reform and Competition: Separating Fact from Fiction: Hearing Before
the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 108th Cong. 72 (2003) (statement of Joseph R. Antos,
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program when it was established in 1997 and is the goal of the Medicare
Advantage program today. 63 As other articles in this Symposium establish,
however, there is no evidence that Medicare Advantage is saving or can
save money for Medicare.64 Indeed, Medicare Advantage is increasing
program expenses.65 There may be reasons for having a Medicare
managed care program, but saving money is not one of them.
Another proposal put forth from time to time is to reduce costs by
slowing Medicare’s adoption of new technologies.66 There is a good deal
of comparative data that indicates that one of the reasons why the United
States has the most costly healthcare system in the world is because we
adopt new medical technologies sooner, disseminate them more quickly
and broadly, and use them more frequently than most other countries.67
Currently, Medicare does assess new technologies for coverage, but
assessment is limited mainly to procedures and devices covered by Part B.68
Part A providers are paid on a prospective payment basis and make their
own judgments as to technology acquisition based on the funding that they
have available.69 Part D drug plans are also free to make their own
coverage decisions as long as basic categories and classes of drugs are
covered.70
Although new technologies generally add rather than save costs, they
also often add considerable value.71 Therefore, any strategy aimed at
cutting Medicare costs by limiting access to technology must consider how
much we would be losing in potential enhanced value. Controlling
technology adoption, moreover, is very difficult politically. An eight nation

American Enterprise Institute); Stuart M. Butler & Robert E. Moffit, The FEHBP as a Model for a
New Medicare Program, 14 HEALTH AFF. 47, 55-56 (1995).
63. See Brian Biles et al., Medicare Advantage: Déjà Vu All Over Again, 2004 HEALTH
AFF. (WEB EXCL.) w4-586, w4-595, available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/
hlthaff.w4.586v1.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2007).
64. Berenson & Goldstein, supra note 12, at 5-12; McBride, supra note 12.
65. Biles et al., supra note 63.
66. See Mark V. Pauly, What if Technology Never Stops Improving? Medicare’s Future
Under Continuous Cost Increases, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1233, 1242 (2003).
67. See TIMOTHY S. JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK: A CRITIQUE OF THE CONSUMER-DRIVEN
MOVEMENT 176 (2007).
68. See Timothy S. Jost, The Medicare Coverage Determination Process in the United
States, in HEALTH CARE COVERAGE DETERMINATIONS 207, 211 (Timothy S. Jost ed., 2005).
69. Id.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-104(b)(3) (Supp. III 2003); see also JACK HOADLEY ET AL., THE
HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE MEDICARE DRUG BENEFIT: AN IN-DEPTH EXAMINATION OF
FORMULARIES AND OTHER FEATURES OF MEDICARE DRUG PLANS, at i, 1 (2006), available at
www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7489.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2007).
71. DAVID M. CUTLER, YOUR MONEY OR YOUR LIFE: STRONG MEDICINE FOR AMERICA’S
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 73, 75 (2004).
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study of public-insurance program technology-coverage policies concluded
that most other developed countries do not even try to apply cost-benefit
analysis in deciding whether or not to cover technologies in their public
programs, but instead only assess effectiveness.72 In most instances,
moreover, technology advocates, be they technology sponsors, providers
looking for new tools, or patients hoping for new cures, overwhelm those
who try to hold the line on program costs in coverage proceedings.73
Technology manufacturers are unlikely to give up the largest health
insurance market in the United States without a fight.74 It is also hard to
believe that Medicare beneficiaries would be willing to settle for secondclass medical care. Hospitals will, in all likelihood, continue to purchase
new technologies based on their own judgments of whether or not they are
valuable, and once hospitals acquire such technologies it will be difficult to
deny Medicare beneficiaries access to them. Doctors will also worry that
they will be held to the evolving standard of care of their profession, despite
what Medicare may decide to pay for, and will do what they can politically
to assure Medicare coverage.75 Thus, thinking that technology assessment
alone will save Medicare is unrealistic.
In the end, I believe three approaches show the most promise for
addressing the increased costs of Medicare; although, none of them offer a
magic bullet and all will be difficult to implement. First, and probably most
importantly, we will need to raise taxes. We have chosen, I believe wisely,
to finance healthcare for the elderly and disabled through a public program.
Since Medicare began in the 1960s, an ever greater percentage of our
population has become elderly and disabled.76 Over the next couple of
decades this percentage will continue to grow.77 Thus, even if healthcare
costs were not increasing at a rate in excess of general inflation, we would
be paying more for healthcare costs from public funds because an ever

72. See Timothy S. Jost, What Can We Learn From Our Country Studies?, in HEALTH CARE
COVERAGE DETERMINATIONS 236, 251 (Timothy S. Jost ed., 2005).
73. See id. at 259-60.
74. See id. at 229-30 (describing the participation of technology proponents in the
current system).
75. See Miriam J. Laugesen & Thomas Rice, Is the Doctor in? The Revolving Role of
Organized Medicine in Health Policy, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 289, 300 (2003).
76. In 1965, 9.5% of the U.S. population was over age sixty-five. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
TABLE HS-3, POPULATION BY AGE: 1900 - 2002, available at www.census.gov/statab/hist/HS03.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2007). In 2005, this age group made up 12.4% of the
population. ADMINISTRATION ON AGING, STATISTICS ON THE AGING POPULATION, at www.aoa.
gov/prof/Statistics/statistics.asp (last visited Sept. 29, 2007).
77. It is estimated that by 2030 the number of persons over age sixty-five in the United
States will double and constitute 20% of the population. ADMINISTRATION ON AGING, supra
note 76.
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greater percentage of the population will be above age sixty-five, and,
therefore, covered by public insurance. But, at the same time, the
proportion of GDP spent on healthcare is rising in the United States.78 In
other words, we are increasing the percentage of public funds used to pay
for the increasing percentage of GDP spent on healthcare, and we are
foolish to think we can do so without increasing public revenues.
How we increase public revenues is vitally important. It might have
made sense in 1965 to pay for Medicare from payroll taxes. Today,
however, a greater percentage of our national income is received in forms
other than wages,79 and an ever greater share of our national income is
going to an ever smaller proportion of the population.80 It is unjust to
finance Medicare with a regressive tax on wages because many poor
workers would not otherwise even be paying taxes given that their incomes
are so low.81 Over the past several years, a growing share of the program
has been funded using general revenue; although, the MMA has tried to
limit this growth.82 New program revenues, however, should come primarily
78. See White, supra note 36, at 157 tbl.2.
79. In 1965, employee compensation represented 71.9% of national personal income,
but today it only represents 67.7%. Conversely, interest and dividends represented 10.7% of
national personal income in 1965; today they represent 16.4%. See BUREAU OF ECON.
ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCTS ACCOUNTS TABLE, TABLE
2.1: PERSONAL INCOME AND ITS DISPOSITION, www.bea.gov/National/nipaweb/TableView.asp?
SelectedTable=58&FirstYear=2005&LastYear=2007&Freq=Qtr
(Under
“Data
Table
Options,” choose “1965-Q & A” as “First Year” and “2006-Q & A” as “Last Year.” Then click
“Update”).
80. See AVIVA ARON-DINE & ISAAC SHAPIRO, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, NEW DATA
SHOW EXTRAORDINARY JUMP IN INCOME CONCENTRATION IN 2004, 1 (2006), available at
www.cbpp.org/7-10-06inc.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2007). Americans with the highest
incomes have also benefited disproportionately from recent tax cuts and would benefit most
from extension of those tax cuts. See AVIVA ARON-DINE, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES,
THE SKEWED BENEFITS OF THE TAX CUTS, 2008-2017, 2-4, available at www.cbpp.org/2-5-07
tax.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2007).
81. Economists estimated that 121 million Americans would not have federal income tax
liability in 2006, including 91 million people represented by 43.4 million filed income tax
returns with zero or negative tax liability. SCOTT A. HODGE, TAX FOUND., NUMBER OF
AMERICANS PAYING ZERO FEDERAL INCOME TAX GROWS TO 43.4 MILLION (2006), available at
www.taxfoundation.org/files/ff54.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2007). All employed and selfemployed persons, however, must pay the Medicare payroll tax.
82. Medicare Part A is funded by payroll taxes and Parts B and D are funded through
premiums and general revenue funds. The Trustees’ spending projections for 2007 are $208
billion by the Part A (HI) Trust Fund and $230 billion by the Parts B and D (SMI) Trust Fund. In
2016, the Trustees project, the Part A Trust Fund will spend $385 billion and the SMI Trust
Fund will spend $478 billion. 2007 TRUST FUND REPORTS SUMMARY, supra note 1, at 5 tbl.
“Estimated Operations of Trust Funds”.
The Trustees project that general revenue
contributions to Medicare will rise from 1.3% of the GDP in 2007 to 4.7% in 2081, while
payroll tax contributions will remain stable at 1.5% of GDP over that period. Id. at 9. The
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from a progressive income tax, perhaps combined with a consumption tax if
it can be designed to be non-regressive.
Of course no one likes taxes. While they do impose a burden on the
economy, the proportion of GDP spent on taxes in the United States is still
lower than in most developed countries.83 At the high end, income tax rates
are lower now than they were for most of the last century,84 a century that
saw unprecedented economic growth.85 Even if Americans pay more in
income tax to finance healthcare, their incomes are still likely to continue to
grow as they have over the past century, leaving an ever larger amount of
Also, we must
discretionary income for non-health expenditures.86
remember that more money spent on healthcare means more jobs in
healthcare—already one of the strongest growing sectors of our economy.87
In particular, healthcare sector growth means more domestic jobs, since it is
harder to outsource healthcare provision than, say, textiles or automobile
production. Additionally, more money spent on healthcare, including

MMA requires the Trustees of the Medicare Trust Funds to project each year whether during
that year or any of the six succeeding years the proportion of Medicare expenditures funded by
general revenue funds (i.e., that part not covered by beneficiary premiums, Part A payroll
taxes, or from other dedicated sources) is likely to exceed 45%. Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-173 § 801, 117 Stat. 2066, 2357-60
(2003). If, for two years in a row, the Trustees project that this will happen during the
succeeding six years, the President must present to Congress within fifteen days proposed
legislation to eliminate the “excess general revenue funding” problem. The Senate and House
will then handle the legislation under special rules and engage in very limited debate. Id. at §§
802-804. The Trustees have found excess general revenue spending for 2006 and 2007, but
no action has been taken by the President as of this writing.
83. Sonya Hoo & Eric Toder, The U.S. Tax Burden is Low Relative to Other OECD
Countries, TAX NOTES (Tax Pol’y Ctr., Wash. D.C.), May 8, 2006, at 695, available at
www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000976_Tax_Fact_05-08-06.pdf (last visited Sept.
29, 2007).
84. See TruthAndPolitics.org, Top U.S. Marginal Income Tax Rates, 1913–2003, at
www.truthandpolitics.org/top-rates.php (last visited Sept. 29, 2007).
85. See, e.g., Robert J. Gordon, U.S. Economic Growth Since 1870: One Big Wave?, 89
AM. ECON. REV. 123 (1999).
86. Between 1970 and 2005 the proportion of the GDP spent on healthcare grew from
7.2% to 16%. Over the same period, however, the real GDP grew from $3.7 trillion to $11
trillion in constant dollars. Assuming healthcare costs will continue to increase in the future at
rates in excess of inflation, it is reasonable to expect discretionary income to continue to
increase as well. See Aaron Catlin et al., National Health Spending in 2005: The Slowdown
Continues, 26 HEALTH AFF. 142, 143 tbl.1 (2007).
87. Between 2001 and 2006, the healthcare sector added 1.7 million jobs, while the rest
of the private sector economy had zero job growth. Michael Mandel & Joseph Weber, What’s
Really Propping Up the Economy?, BUS. WK., Sept. 25, 2006, at 54, available at
www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_39/b4002001.htm (last visited Oct. 13,
2007).
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Medicare, will result in more money collected in taxes; although, of course,
the Medicare program will not be self-financing.
A second strategy is to limit the growth of provider payments. One fact
that clearly emerges from comparative analysis is that the United States pays
higher prices for healthcare than any other developed nation.88 We
consume about the same volume of drugs, hospital days, and physician
visits as other countries, but we pay more for them.89 If we could cut our
payment levels to those found in France or Germany, or even Canada or
Switzerland, we could cut Medicare costs dramatically.90 Obviously how
much and how fast Medicare can cut costs is limited. But in the long run,
American healthcare professionals, providers, and drug companies will have
to learn to live with incomes and profits more like those enjoyed by their
counterparts in other developed countries.
Medicare has primarily controlled costs through, as noted above,
administered prices. Beginning with its DRG (diagnosis-related group)
prospective payment system in 1982, Medicare has developed a series of
prospective payment systems now covering virtually all of the services for
which Medicare pays.91 While these prospective payment systems can be
used effectively to cut costs, as was done following the Balanced Budget Act
of 1997,92 the cost-cutting goal has rarely been accomplished. The annual
dance around the physician payment update, in which Congress invariably
intervenes to raise prices paid to physicians even though physicians are
already receiving higher incomes because of increased volume,93 illustrates
the serious difficulty inherent in cutting, or even controlling, payments to
providers.
Medicare should use its prospective payment system more aggressively
to slow down the growth of healthcare costs—it should actually deny
physicians price increases if volume continues to increase dramatically.
However, Medicare should also look to other purchasing approaches, as
discussed later in this article.
A third strategy for achieving Medicare savings is to focus on improving
the quality of treatment beneficiaries receive. A generation of work by Jack
88. Gerard F. Anderson et al., It’s the Prices, Stupid: Why the United States is so Different
from Other Countries, 22 HEALTH AFF. 89, 90 (2003).
89. Id. at 93-103.
90. Id. at 91 tbl.1.
91. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4 (2000) (payment for physician’s services), § 1395ww
(payment for inpatient hospital services), § 1395yy (payment for skilled nursing facility services
for routine service costs). See generally, RICK MAYES & ROBERT A. BERENSON, MEDICARE
PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT AND THE SHAPING OF U.S. HEALTH CARE (2006) (analyzing the history of
Medicare prospective payment).
92. MAYES & BERENSON, supra note 91, at 115.
93. See id. at 142-45.
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Wennberg and his associates has shown conclusively that the use of
Medicare services varies dramatically from one geographic area to another
in ways that have little do with actual medical need.94 In particular,
Wennberg has identified dramatic variations in what he terms “supplysensitive” services, i.e., services that tend to be provided in greater volume
where the capacity to provide them is greater.95 Patients with non-surgical
medical conditions, for example, are more likely to be hospitalized in
regions with more hospital beds, and Medicare enrollees are seen by
cardiologists more often in areas with more cardiologists.96 Supply-sensitive
care accounts for a surprisingly high proportion of Medicare spending.97
Most disconcerting, however, is the finding that some measures of quality,
including mortality rates, may be worse in regions where supply-sensitive
service use is higher.98 This finding leads to the conclusion that excess
spending is doing harm, not good.
At the same time that research has been demonstrating that a great deal
of healthcare spending is on apparently unnecessary services, another body
of research has shown that the nature of services provided to Medicare
beneficiaries has been changing. We have long known that a high
percentage of Medicare payments go to beneficiaries with chronic diseases
and with disabilities that limit their daily living activities.99 Nearly 80% of
Medicare beneficiaries have at least one chronic disease,100 and one-fifth of
Medicare beneficiaries with five or more chronic conditions account for twothirds of Medicare spending.101 There is evidence, however, that in recent
years Medicare expenditures have grown most rapidly for beneficiaries who

94. John E. Wennberg et al., Geography and the Debate Over Medicare Reform, 2002
HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCL.) w96-98, available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/
hlthaff.w2.96v1 (last visited Sept. 29, 2007).
95. Id. at w101-02.
96. THE DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE, SUPPLY-SENSITIVE CARE 2-3, available at
www.dartmouthatlas.org/topics/supply_sensitive.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2007).
97. Id. at 1.
98. Elliott S. Fisher et al., The Implications of Regional Variations in Medicare Spending.
Part 2: Health Outcomes and Satisfaction With Care, 138 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 288,
291-93 (2003) (noting, however, that this conclusion “must be interpreted with caution”).
99. STUART GUTERMAN & MICHELLE P. SERBER, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, ENHANCING
VALUE IN MEDICARE: DEMONSTRATIONS AND OTHER INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE THE PROGRAM 3
(2007), available at www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/990_Guterman_enhancing_
value_Medicare.pdf?section=4039 (last visited Sept. 29, 2007).
100. Nora Super, Medicare’s Chronic Care Improvement Pilot Program: What is Its
Potential?, NHPF ISSUE BRIEF (Nat’l Health Pol. Forum, Wash. D.C.), May 10, 2004, at 3,
available at www.nhpf.org/pdfs_ib/IB797_ChronicCare.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2007).
101. GUTERMAN & SERBER, supra note 99, at 2 fig.3.
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do not have serious diseases or functional limitations.102 Much of this cost
is attributable to the management of metabolic disorders, such as high
blood pressure or high cholesterol, which are not themselves symptomatic
diseases.103
In a number of recent articles, Kenneth Thorpe and associates contend
that a major factor in the increase of Medicare expenditures is the rise in
obesity among the elderly.104 While, as just noted, chronic diseases are
responsible for a significant proportion of Medicare costs, these costs are to
some extent self-limiting. That is, people with chronic diseases tend to die
earlier; although their medical care costs more per year, they live fewer
years.105 On the other hand, healthy people live longer; although their
medical care costs less per year, their expenses accrue for more years.106 In
the end, all beneficiaries die, and dying is usually expensive.107
However, obese people, who often suffer from diabetes and
hypertension among other conditions, not only need high cost medical care
on a continual basis, but they also tend to live as long, probably even
longer, than persons of normal weight.108 On the other hand, they tend to
spend more years with disabilities limiting their daily activities.109 Thus, over
a lifetime, they are very expensive to care for. The proportion of Medicare
beneficiaries who are obese has been growing rapidly in recent years, a fact

102. Kenneth E. Thorpe & David H. Howard, The Rise in Spending Among Medicare
Beneficiaries: The Role of Chronic Disease Prevalence and Changes in Treatment Intensity,
2006 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCL.) w378, w382-83, available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/
cgi/reprint/25/5/w378 (last visited Sept. 29, 2007).
103. See id. at w380; see also, Kenneth E. Thorpe et al., The Impact of Obesity on Rising
Medical Spending, 2004 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCL.) w4-480, available at http://content.health
affairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.480v1 (last visited Oct. 1, 2007) (an earlier report by Thorpe
and colleagues on the impact of obesity on healthcare costs generally); Darius N. Lakdawalla
et al., The Health and Cost Consequences of Obesity Among the Future Elderly, 2005 HEALTH
AFF. (WEB EXCL.) w5-R30 (a similar report from a RAND research group).
104. See, e.g., Thorpe & Howard, supra note 102, at w381-82.
105. Geoffrey F. Joyce et al., The Lifetime Burden of Chronic Disease Among the Elderly,
2005 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCL.) W5-R18, W5-R27, available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/
cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w5.r18v1 (last visited Oct. 1, 2007); James Lubitz et al., Health, Life
Expectancy, and Health Care Spending Among the Elderly, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1048,
1052-54 (2003) (discussing the relationship between age, health, and health expenditures).
106. Lubitz et al., supra note 105, at 1054.
107. However, death at an older age may be less costly. See Donald Reed House, The
Cost of Dying on Medicare: An Analysis of Expenditure Data 182 (Aug. 2005) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Texas A&M University), available at http://txspace.tamu.edu/bitstream/
1969.1/2559/1/etd-tamu-2005B-ECON-House.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2007).
108. “Overweight” people aged seventy years tend to live the longest, followed by the
obese, normal weight, and underweight persons aged seventy years, in that order.
Lakdawalla et al., supra note 103, at w5-R35.
109. Id.
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that may account for a considerable share of recent increases in Medicare
costs.110
One way to respond to the increase in obesity is to focus on better
public health education for beneficiaries.111 As is true with many of the rest
of us (or, in any event, me), many Medicare beneficiaries need to eat less
and exercise more. But changing lifestyles is very difficult at any age, and is
unlikely to be easier for the elderly.
In addition to focusing on improving beneficiaries’ health as a way to
reduce costs, Medicare reform must also target the behavior of providers to
assure that services are provided as appropriately, effectively, and efficiently
as possible so that the number and intensity of Medicare services do not
exceed the care level beneficiaries actually need. Controlling the growth in
provider payments; decreasing the frequency of the provision of
unnecessary, inappropriate, or ineffective services; and providing more
appropriate care for chronic diseases and metabolic disorders are all
components of the effort to improve value purchasing within Medicare.112 A
number of private sector programs and public demonstration projects are
currently attempting to improve value purchasing, for example, through
better chronic care and disease management or by paying for
performance.113 Competitive purchasing programs also hold the promise of
allowing Medicare to focus on value, i.e., higher quality at a lower price, in
purchasing.114 Finally, fee-for-service Medicare might benefit from using
traditional managed care tools—using limited networks of providers or
tiered networks, or pre-procedure or admission review processes, for
example, to maximize the value of purchased care.115
There are three problems with implementing the value purchasing
approach to saving Medicare. First, we are not very good at it yet. For
110. See Thorpe & Howard, supra note 102, at w382.
111. See, e.g., RAND CORP., FUTURE HEALTH AND MEDICAL CARE SPENDING AMONG THE
ELDERLY: IMPLICATIONS FOR MEDICARE 5 (2005), available at www.rand.org/pubs/research_
briefs/RB9146-1/RAND_RB9146-1.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2007) (noting that prevention
and screening for chronic conditions could be effective public health measures).
112. See MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND, VALUE PURCHASERS IN HEALTH CARE: SEVEN CASE STUDIES
2 (2001), available at www.milbank.org/reports/2001ValuePurchasers/ValuePurchasers_
Mech.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2007) (defining value purchasing as “an organized attempt by
a private- or public-sector purchaser to ensure quality and to improve health outcomes, as
well as negotiating prices, as an explicit part of its health care buying strategy”).
113. See GUTERMAN & SERBER, supra note 99, at 6-7, 13, 16 (describing Medicare
chronic-care and provider-performance initiatives).
114. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MEDICARE: PAST EXPERIENCE CAN GUIDE FUTURE
COMPETITIVE BIDDING FOR MEDICAL EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES 2 (2004), available at
www.gao.gov/new.items/d04765.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2007).
115. See Robert A. Berenson & Dean M. Harris, Using Managed Care Tools in Traditional
Medicare–Should We? Could We?, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139 (2002).
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example, a recent Congressional Budget Office review of the literature on
disease management concluded that although there is some evidence that it
improves care for those with chronic diseases, there is no significant
evidence that it saves money.116 Although Medicare has conducted several
demonstration projects using case or disease management, there is no
definitive evidence that these approaches can save money.117 While there is
a great deal of interest in paying for performance, there is also concern that
if not done right, it might increase disparities in healthcare or result in
underservice for persons whose health problems are not targeted by the
payment mechanism.118 Also, as recent British experience seems to have
shown, paying for performance can offer opportunities for gaming the
system which can result in increased costs.119
Second, there is tremendous political opposition to value purchasing, at
least insofar as it results in losers as well as winners on the provider side.120
Everyone is in favor of competition, but no one wants to be a loser.
Attempts to introduce competitive purchasing into Medicare have been
blocked by politicians whose constituents complain about losing Medicare
business.121 Medicare’s Centers of Excellence program, which seems to
have been quite successful in improving care, had to be renamed because
excluded providers complained that they, too, were excellent.122 Thus,
across Medicare, limited-provider networks, tiered networks, or limited
formularies would face tremendous political opposition.
Finally, there are legal barriers to using value purchasing. At its creation
in 1965, Medicare offered benefits very similar to the contemporary Blue

116. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE LITERATURE ON DISEASE
MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS 9 (Oct. 13, 2004), available at www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/59xx/
doc5909/10-13-DiseaseMngmnt.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2007).
117. See RANDALL BROWN ET AL., MATHEMATICA POL. RES., INC., COORDINATING CARE FOR
MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES: EARLY EXPERIENCES WITH 15 DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS, THEIR PATIENTS,
AND PROVIDERS 7 (2004), available at www.mathematica-mpr.com/publications/PDFs/
bestpraccongressional.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2007); GUTERMAN & SERBER, supra note 99, at
9; Marsha Gold et al., Challenges in Improving Care for High-Risk Seniors in Medicare, 2005
HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCL.) w5-199.
118. Lawrence P. Casalino et al., Will Pay-for-Performance and Quality Reporting Affect
Health Care Disparities?, 2007 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCL.) w405, w406-09.
119. See Robert Galvin, Pay-for-Performance: Too Much of a Good Thing? A Conversation
with Martin Roland, 2006 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCL.) w412, w413.
120. See MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND, supra note 112, at 4, 7.
121. Barbara S. Cooper & Bruce C. Vladeck, Bringing Competitive Pricing to Medicare, 19
HEALTH AFF. 49, 52-54 (2000).
122. Robert A. Berenson, Paying for Quality and Doing it Right, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1315, 1331 (2003).
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Cross and Blue Shield plans, focusing on hospital and physician services.123
The program’s creators went to great lengths to mollify the concerns of the
doctors and hospitals whose cooperation was necessary for the program to
succeed.124 The first provision of the Medicare statute prohibits government
interference in the practice of medicine, while the second provision
enshrines the principle of free choice of provider.125 The third provision of
the statute guarantees beneficiaries the right to purchase private
insurance.126 The 1965 statute established Medicare Parts A and B—two
completely different programs with different financing mechanisms and
different administrative, payment, and cost-sharing structures—to cover
institutional services (Part A) and professional and related services (Part
Like contemporary employment-related insurance programs,
B).127
Medicare was designed to cover acute care and specifically excluded longterm custodial care.128 The program did not include a catastrophic benefit;
it imposed limits on hospital, nursing care, and home health benefits; and it
did not establish limits on beneficiary cost-sharing.129 Furthermore, it did
not cover outpatient drugs, preventive services, or nursing home care aside
from 100 days of post-hospital extended care.130
The program has evolved a great deal over the years, but much remains
the same. Although Medicare now has a drug benefit and covers more
preventive care, it still provides only limited coverage for long-term care and
offers no catastrophic benefit.131 It still takes a silo approach to care.
Indeed, with the evolution of prospective payment systems over the years on
a service-by-service basis, Medicare is more balkanized than ever.132
Further, Medicare prospective payment legislation defines very specifically
how each provider is to be paid,133 leaving little room for creativity and
flexibility. Although the Medicare program is pursuing a number of
demonstration projects to explore better coordination of care, these are
123. See Judith R. Lave, The Structure of the Medicare Benefit Package: Evolution and
Options for Change, in LESSONS FROM THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS OF MEDICARE 3, 4 (Mark V.
Pauly & William L. Kissick, eds., 1986); PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
MEDICINE 375 (1982).
124. STARR, supra note 123, at 374-78.
125. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395, 1395a (2000).
126. Id. § 1395b.
127. See Lave, supra note 123, at 3, 4.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a) (2000); Lave, supra note 123, at 4.
129. See Lave, supra note 123, at 4-5, 11.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 11.
132. See generally MAYES & BERENSON, supra note 91.
133. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4 (2000) (payment for physician’s services), § 1395ww
(payment for inpatient hospital services), § 1395yy (payment for skilled nursing facility services
for routine service costs).
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narrow in their scope and usually limited by budget neutrality requirements
that greatly constrain their flexibility.134 The Medicare program is also
governed by the Administrative Procedures Act135 and its incrustations, which
currently make formal regulatory action very difficult (particularly under an
administration that is not a friend of social insurance).
Constitutional impediments are unlikely to block value purchasing in
Medicare. Not all courts have found that providers have a property or
liberty interest in Medicare participation, and even those courts that do find
a constitutionally protected interest tend to defer to program decisions.136
But the current Medicare statute does impose a straitjacket on the Medicare
program that deprives it of much of the flexibility that would be needed to
make value purchasing a reality.137
From the 2000 election through the 2006 election, those in power in
Washington have appeared to place their hopes for Medicare reform on
moving Medicare toward defined contribution or consumer-driven models in
the long run and on Medicare managed care in the short run.138 Medicare
managed care has failed, and moving to consumer-driven or definedcontribution models is neither advisable as a matter of policy nor possible as
a matter of politics.139 It is time to turn our attention to how to make
traditional Medicare work better. The focus should be on allowing
traditional Medicare to engage in value purchasing, which will require
changing the Medicare statute. Section 1,140 for example, should be
amended to remove the non-interference provision and replace it with a
positive statement that Medicare is responsible for assuring that providers,
professionals, and suppliers offer beneficiaries effective, appropriate, and
high-quality care. Section 2141 should be amended to remove the free
choice of provider language and replace it with a statement that
beneficiaries are entitled to a choice of high-quality and efficient providers,
134. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 117, at 10, 15; GUTERMAN & SERBER, supra note 99, at
25.
135. Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-596 (2000).
136. See Timothy S. Jost, Administrative Law Issues Involving the Medicare Utilization and
Quality Control Peer Review Organization (PRO) Program: Analysis and Recommendations, 50
Ohio St. L.J. 1, 38-39 (1989); Timothy S. Jost, Governing Medicare, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 39,
45-65 (1999); Ruqaiijah A. Yearby, A Right to No Meaningful Review Under the Due Process
Clause: The Aftermath of Judicial Deference to the Federal Administrative Agencies, 16 HEALTH
MATRIX 723, 724 (2006).
137. See MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND, supra note 112, at 108.
138. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE: MEDICARE ADVANTAGE (June
2007), available at www.kff.org/medicare/upload/2052-10.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2007)
(outlining the growth in the types of Medicare plans since 1999).
139. See JOST, supra note 67 (critiquing the consumer-driven movement).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2000).
141. Id. § 1395a.
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suppliers, and professionals. Whole sections of the statute need to be
amended to allow more flexibility in purchasing. In particular, the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services should be given broad statutory
authority to fund demonstration projects in value purchasing without being
tied down by immediate budget neutrality requirements. Instead, budget
neutrality should be assessed over the long term because a little extra
spending now might save a great deal in the future.
In conclusion, while Medicare has been a success overall, it does have
problems. The long-term survival of the Medicare program does depend on
increased tax funding, but provider costs also need to be controlled.
Medicare also needs to improve its value-purchasing ability in order to both
save money and improve beneficiary care. In the end, however, changes in
Medicare policy will require changes in the Medicare law. This article has
suggested where these changes might begin.
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